Basel Institute on Governance resource Organizations & Associations OCEG Reviewed
The Basel Institute on Governance is an independent and non-profit think tank conducting research and offering policy advice and capacity building support in public, global and corporate governance/compliance. Through the International Centre for Asset Recovery, we further provide training and advisory services in the field of asset recovery.
Be Prepared: The Board's Role in Succession Planning (2007) resource Articles Member contributionOCEG Reviewed
BIS, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) resource White Papers OCEG Reviewed
BIS, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards (September 2010) resource Standards and Guidelines OCEG Reviewed
Introduction: At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010.
Board Evaluations - Deloitte's Center for Corporate Governance resource Guides OCEG Reviewed
There are various evaluation approaches and each board should apply a process that best meets its needs. Beyond the traditional use of questionnaires (self and peer rating techniques), organizations may develop metrics for performance (inputs and outcomes) or commission an independent review that includes detailed interviews of directors and senior management.
Board Oversight of Information Technology - Data Privacy and Data Security: The New Imperative (2007) resource Articles OCEG Reviewed
Board Responsibilities and Creating Value: Demonstrating Leadership and Accountability (ICAEW, 2006) resource White Papers OCEG Reviewed
Board Structure and Price Informativeness (April 2010) resource White Papers OCEG Reviewed
Abstract: This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate boards, finding a negative relation between price informativeness and board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls - including firm fixed effects - and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness.